| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Fraunhofer HHI VVdeC before 3.2.1 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the decoder by supplying bitstreams with overlapping slice CTU coverage. Attackers can code a CTU in a second slice so a bi-predicted BDOF coding unit carries a negative reference index, causing Slice::getRefPic to read outside m_apcRefPicList and crash decoding. |
| NVIDIA Slurm contains a vulnerability where a user could deliberately alter the provided nodelist alongside the --distribution=arbitrary option to gain access to compute nodes outside of the current job allocation. |
| Netrek-client-cow through 3.3.3 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in short.c handleSMessage() that allows malicious servers to crash clients via an unchecked m_recpt index. Attackers controlling a Netrek server or intercepting the plaintext TCP connection can send SP_S_MESSAGE packets with m_recpt of 36 or more, reading past players[] and shipnos to deny service. |
| Incorrect handling of unauthenticated downlink RRC Setup messages can cause the baseband to crash |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: Validate SVID index in svdm_consume_modes()
In svdm_consume_modes(), the SVID value is read from pmdata->svids using
pmdata->svid_index as an array index without bounds validation:
paltmode->svid = pmdata->svids[pmdata->svid_index];
If pmdata->svid_index is driven beyond SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX (16), it results
in an out-of-bounds read of the pmdata->svids array. Because pd_mode_data
is embedded inside struct tcpm_port, indexing past svids reads into
adjacent fields. In particular:
- At index 16, it reads the altmodes count.
- At index 18 and beyond, it reads into altmode_desc[], which contains
partner-supplied SVDM Discovery Modes VDOs.
By injecting a chosen SVID into altmode_desc[0].vdo and driving svid_index
to 20, the partner can force paltmode->svid to be loaded with an arbitrary,
partner- chosen SVID, which is then registered via
typec_partner_register_altmode().
Fix this by validating that pmdata->svid_index is non-negative and strictly
less than pmdata->nsvids before accessing the pmdata->svids array inside
svdm_consume_modes(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136
The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes
rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data
packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed
tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the
events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each
element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any
touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and
parsed improperly.
Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event
based on the device's specific event size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index
cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values
0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array
access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of
range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to
determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6
address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask
attribute length. A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore
provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask
attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or
struct in6_addr.
NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use
NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask
attributes. This rejects short attributes during policy validation and
also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection. |
| ASN1SCC is an open source ASN.1 compiler for embedded systems. Prior to 4.7.0.1, BitStream_DecodeConstraintWholeNumber in asn1crt/asn1crt_encoding.c reads enough bits for a constrained integer but does not reject values above the declared range when the encoded range is not a power of two. Generated uPER and ACN decoders for variable-size SEQUENCE OF, OCTET STRING, BIT STRING, and string values use the invalid result as a loop or copy length, so a crafted over-range size field can write beyond a destination buffer. Decoding untrusted affected data can corrupt heap or stack memory, cause a crash, or potentially permit code execution. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.0.1. |
| ASN1SCC is an open source ASN.1 compiler for embedded systems. Prior to 4.7.0.1, the ACN runtime function Acn_Dec_String_CharIndex_private in asn1crt/asn1crt_encoding_acn.c and the generated uPER decoder InternalItem_string_with_alpha_decode in StgC/uper_c.stg do not validate a decoded character index before reading allowedCharSet. For string alphabets whose size is not a power of two, a crafted message can select an unused encoded index, read a small bounded window of adjacent static program constants, and return the byte as a successfully decoded character. The full 128-character IA5String alphabet is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.0.1. |
| VRPN through 07.36 contains an out-of-bounds stack write vulnerability in vrpn_Endpoint::handle_sender_message() and handle_type_message() that allows unauthenticated remote peers to write outside a stack buffer via an unchecked length index. Attackers can connect, complete the version-cookie exchange, and send a SENDER_DESCRIPTION or TYPE_DESCRIPTION message with an out-of-range or negative index to crash the process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Fix missing SPDIFI1 index handling
SPDIF1 DAIO type isn't properly handled in daio_device_index() for
hw20k2, and it returned -EINVAL, which ended up with the out-of-bounds
array access. Follow the hw20k1 pattern and return the proper index
for this type, too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_notify_common()
The connector number extracted from CCI via UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR() is a
7-bit field (0-127) that is used to index into the connector array in
ucsi_connector_change(). However, the array is only allocated for the
number of connectors reported by the device (typically 2-4 entries).
A malicious or malfunctioning device could report an out-of-range
connector number in the CCI, causing an out-of-bounds array access in
ucsi_connector_change().
Add a bounds check in ucsi_notify_common(), the central point where CCI
is parsed after arriving from hardware, so that bogus connector numbers
are rejected before they propagate further. |
| A flaw was found in libsolv, a dependency-resolution library used by RPM-based package managers such as dnf and zypper to work with .solv repository cache files. When libsolv rewrites a .solv cache file, it reads directory-id values from the file's compressed filelist data without validating that they fall within the expected range. A corrupted or specially crafted .solv cache file (for example, one left in a torn state after an unclean system shutdown) can cause an out-of-bounds memory write when a tool such as dnf, yum, or zypper next processes it. Successful exploitation is expected to result in a crash of the affected tool (denial of service); it is not expected to allow arbitrary code execution because the out-of-bounds write always stores a fixed, non-attacker-controlled value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check
cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE
entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for
ndpoffset:
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len)
but the second check omits it:
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len)
This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if
the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is
placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can
extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes.
cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating
the DPE array.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to
express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check
The same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also
exists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated
against the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing
out-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to
express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
Compile-tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: use array_index_nospec with indices that come from guest
min and dest_id are guest-controlled indices. Using array_index_nospec()
after the bounds checks clamps these values to mitigate speculative execution
side-channels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: Make sure modelist not set on unregistered console
It looks like attempting to write to the "store_modes" sysfs node will
run afoul of unregistered consoles:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:122:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'fb_info *[32]'
...
fbcon_info_from_console+0x192/0x1a0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:122
fbcon_new_modelist+0xbf/0x2d0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:3048
fb_new_modelist+0x328/0x440 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:673
store_modes+0x1c9/0x3e0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c:113
dev_attr_store+0x55/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2439
static struct fb_info *fbcon_registered_fb[FB_MAX];
...
static signed char con2fb_map[MAX_NR_CONSOLES];
...
static struct fb_info *fbcon_info_from_console(int console)
...
return fbcon_registered_fb[con2fb_map[console]];
If con2fb_map contains a -1 things go wrong here. Instead, return NULL,
as callers of fbcon_info_from_console() are trying to compare against
existing "info" pointers, so error handling should kick in correctly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mdio: validate parameter addr in mdiobus_get_phy()
The caller may pass any value as addr, what may result in an out-of-bounds
access to array mdio_map. One existing case is stmmac_init_phy() that
may pass -1 as addr. Therefore validate addr before using it. |
