| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: ecred_reconfigure: send packed pdu, not stack pointer
Commit 1c08108f3014 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end
warnings") converted the on-stack request PDU in l2cap_ecred_reconfigure()
from an explicit packed struct to DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(), but did not adjust the
size and source-pointer arguments to l2cap_send_cmd():
- struct {
- struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req req;
- __le16 scid;
- } pdu;
+ DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req, pdu, scid, 1);
...
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, chan->ident, L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_REQ,
sizeof(pdu), &pdu);
After the conversion, DEFINE_RAW_FLEX() expands to declare an anonymous
union pdu_u plus a local pointer "pdu" pointing at it. Therefore:
- sizeof(pdu) is now sizeof(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req *) = 8 on
64-bit (4 on 32-bit), not the 6 bytes of (mtu, mps, scid[1]).
- &pdu is the address of the local pointer's stack storage, not the
address of the request payload.
l2cap_send_cmd() forwards (data, count) to l2cap_build_cmd(), which calls
skb_put_data(skb, data, count). The L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ packet
body therefore contains 8 bytes copied from the kernel stack starting at
&pdu -- the 8 bytes overlap the pdu pointer's value, leaking a kernel
stack address to the paired Bluetooth peer. The intended (mtu, mps, scid)
fields are not transmitted at all, so the peer rejects the request as
malformed and the L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE feature itself has been broken
for the local-side initiator since the introducing commit landed.
The sibling site l2cap_ecred_conn_req() in the same commit was converted
correctly (sizeof(*pdu) + len, pdu); only this site was missed.
Restore the original semantics: pass the full flex-struct size via
struct_size(pdu, scid, 1) and the pdu pointer (the struct address) as
the source.
Validated on a stock 7.0-based host kernel via the real call path:
setsockopt(SOL_BLUETOOTH, BT_RCVMTU, ...) on a BT_CONNECTED
L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL socket emits an L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ
whose body is 8 bytes (the on-stack pdu local's value) rather than
the expected 6. Three captures from fresh socket / fresh hciemu peer
on the same host -- low bytes vary per call, high 0xffff confirms a
kernel virtual address (KASLR-randomised stack slot, not a fixed
string):
RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 42 fb 54 af 0e ca ff ff
RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 52 3d 2e af 0e ca ff ff
RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): b2 fc 5b af 0e ca ff ff
After this patch the body is 6 bytes carrying the expected
little-endian (mtu, mps, scid). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path
In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by
the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination
page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt
path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a
single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):
1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16)
before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE,
the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.
2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into
page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows
by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.
Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE -
the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to
a 4096-byte buffer.
Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that
sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest
region.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214
CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
print_report+0xbc/0x260
kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
memcg:ff11000112827d82
flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()
Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/dma: Do not try to iommu_map a 0 length region in swiotlb
iommu_dma_iova_link_swiotlb() processes a mapping that is unaligned in three
parts, the head, middle and trailer. If the middle is empty because there
are no aligned pages it will call down to iommu_map() with a 0 size
which the iommupt implementation will fail as illegal.
It then tries to do an error unwind and starts from the wrong spot
corrupting the mapping so the eventual destruction triggers a WARN_ON.
Check for 0 length and avoid mapping and use offset not 0 as the starting
point to unlink.
This is frequently triggered by using some kinds of thunderbolt NVMe
drives that trigger forced SWIOTLB for unaligned memory. NVMe seems to
pass in oddly aligned buffers for the passthrough commands from smartctl
that hit this condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: fix wrong device for mac_header_xmit check in tcf_blockcast_redir
In tcf_blockcast_redir(), when iterating block ports to redirect
packets to multiple devices, the mac_header_xmit flag is queried
from the wrong device. The loop sends to dev_prev but queries
dev_is_mac_header_xmit(dev) — which is the NEXT device in the
iteration, not the one being sent to.
This causes tcf_mirred_to_dev() to make incorrect decisions about
whether to push or pull the MAC header. When the block contains
mixed device types (e.g., an ethernet veth and a tunnel device),
intermediate devices get the wrong mac_header_xmit flag, leading to
skb header corruption. In the worst case, skb_push_rcsum with an
incorrect mac_len can exhaust headroom and panic.
The last device in the loop is handled correctly (line 365-366 uses
dev_is_mac_header_xmit(dev_prev)), confirming this is a copy-paste
oversight for the intermediate devices.
Fix by using dev_prev instead of dev for the mac_header_xmit query,
consistent with the device actually being sent to. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix oops when split header is enabled
For GMAC4, when split header is enabled, in some rare cases, the
hardware does not fill buf2 of the first descriptor with payload.
Thus we cannot assume buf2 is always fully filled if it is not
the last descriptor. Otherwise, the length of buf2 of the second
descriptor will be calculated wrong and cause an oops:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00019246bfc0
...
x2 : 0000000000000040 x1 : ffff00019246bfc0 x0 : ffff00009246c000
Call trace:
dcache_inval_poc+0x28/0x58 (P)
dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu+0x38/0x6c
__dma_sync_single_for_cpu+0x34/0x6c
stmmac_napi_poll_rx+0x8f0/0xb60
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0x30/0x144
net_rx_action+0x160/0x274
handle_softirqs+0x1b8/0x1fc
...
To fix this, the PL bit-field in RDES3 register is used for all
descriptors, whether it is the last descriptor or not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes
Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a
previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a
BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we
can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but
if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send
and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't
require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user
could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.
Reproducer script:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster.
mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send.
btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true
# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps
# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a
# lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
total=500
for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
done
echo
umount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./test.sh
(...)
Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv
At subvol sv
Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type
Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
And in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg
(...)
[251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252!
[251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
[251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235
[251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
[251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
[251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs]
[251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...)
[251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3
[251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750
[251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820
[251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0
[251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5
[251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[251067.661972] Call Trace:
[251067.662292] <TASK>
[251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs]
[251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs]
[251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs]
[251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
[251067.665837] ? record_root_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: Prevent out-of-bounds access in fw_mbox_index_xlate()
Although it is guided that `#mbox-cells` must be at least 1, there are
many instances of `#mbox-cells = <0>;` in the device tree. If that is
the case and the corresponding mailbox controller does not provide
`fw_xlate` and of_xlate` function pointers, `fw_mbox_index_xlate()` will
be used by default and out-of-bounds accesses could occur due to lack of
bounds check in that function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
APEI/GHES: ARM processor Error: don't go past allocated memory
If the BIOS generates a very small ARM Processor Error, or
an incomplete one, the current logic will fail to deferrence
err->section_length
and
ctx_info->size
Add checks to avoid that. With such changes, such GHESv2
records won't cause OOPSes like this:
[ 1.492129] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
[ 1.495449] Modules linked in:
[ 1.495820] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-00017-gabadcc3553dd-dirty #18 PREEMPT
[ 1.496125] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
[ 1.496433] Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred
[ 1.496967] pstate: 814000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1.497199] pc : log_arm_hw_error+0x5c/0x200
[ 1.497380] lr : ghes_handle_arm_hw_error+0x94/0x220
0xffff8000811c5324 is in log_arm_hw_error (../drivers/ras/ras.c:75).
70 err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)(err + 1);
71 ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)(err_info + err->err_info_num);
72 ctx_err = (u8 *)ctx_info;
73
74 for (n = 0; n < err->context_info_num; n++) {
75 sz = sizeof(struct cper_arm_ctx_info) + ctx_info->size;
76 ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)((long)ctx_info + sz);
77 ctx_len += sz;
78 }
79
and similar ones while trying to access section_length on an
error dump with too small size.
[ rjw: Subject tweaks ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer lies in addressable RAM
Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v3.
When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
#PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page
This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in
commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds")
This patch (of 3):
When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g.
"mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous
kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing
such a buffer can fault during early restore.
Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies
that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies
within addressable memory:
- On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped().
- On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Skip discovery table for offline dies
This warning can be triggered if NUMA is disabled and the system
boots with fewer CPUs than the number of CPUs in die 0.
WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 7257 at uncore.c:1157 uncore_pci_pmu_register+0x136/0x160 [intel_uncore]
Currently, the discovery table continues to be parsed even if all CPUs
in the associated die are offline. This can lead to an array overflow
at "pmu->boxes[die] = box" in uncore_pci_pmu_register(), which may
trigger the warning above or cause other issues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: br_nd_send: validate ND option lengths
br_nd_send() walks ND options according to option-provided lengths.
A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the computed
option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.
Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address. |
| A flaw was found in libarchive. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to trigger a heap overflow by providing a specially crafted tar archive. The issue occurs during the parsing of a PAX extended header containing a malformed SUN.holesdata sparse-file attribute. Successful exploitation could lead to a denial of service, making the system unavailable, or potentially allow for arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker control over the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: Fix possible oob access in mt7925_mac_write_txwi_80211()
Check frame length before accessing the mgmt fields in
mt7925_mac_write_txwi_80211 in order to avoid a possible oob access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message
When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of
the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is
set by the driver as the max size of the buffer.
When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check
the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is
big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to
make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next
message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline
While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments,
avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is
maximum length. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. A remote attacker could exploit this by tricking a user into opening a specially crafted PAA (Paint Shop Pro Array) image file. This vulnerability, a heap-based out-of-bounds write in the decode_lzss() function of the PAA file format plugin, allows data to be written beyond the intended memory buffer. This could lead to heap metadata corruption and potentially enable the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system. |
| A flaw was found in the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD). The pam_passkey_child_read_data() function within the PAM passkey responder fails to properly handle raw bytes received from a pipe. Because the data is treated as a NUL-terminated C string without explicit termination, it results in an out-of-bounds read when processed by functions like snprintf(). A local attacker could potentially trigger this vulnerability by initiating a crafted passkey authentication request, causing the SSSD PAM responder to crash, resulting in a local Denial of Service (DoS). |
