| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: take commit root semaphore when iterating in mark_block_group_to_copy()
mark_block_group_to_copy() iterates over the commit root with
skip_locking=true. A concurrent transaction commit can swap and free
the commit root during iteration, causing use-after-free when
accessing extent buffers.
Fix it by using path->need_commit_sem to protect the commit root search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pwm-fan) Stop RPM timer before freeing tach data
sample_timer() rearms the RPM timer and accesses the devm-managed
ctx->tachs and ctx->pulses_per_revolution arrays. The cleanup action
which stops the timer is registered before those arrays are allocated.
Since devres releases entries in reverse order, driver detach can free
the arrays before pwm_fan_cleanup() shuts down the timer. A timer expiry
in that window accesses the freed tach data.
With a KASAN kernel, a test-only kprobe delayed entry to
pwm_fan_cleanup() while normal sysfs unbind ran. Each of three runs
reported three four-byte reads and two four-byte writes in sample_timer()
after its backing devm allocations had been freed. The helper did not
invoke the timer callback, cleanup actions or free functions.
With the fix, three matching unbind runs completed without KASAN, BUG,
WARNING, Oops or panic. Instrumentation confirmed that timer retirement
completed before the first timer backing allocation was released.
Split timer retirement from the power cleanup and register its devres
action after the timer backing data and IRQ actions are installed. This
preserves the early power rollback action while ensuring the timer is
retired before its backing data is released. Use timer_shutdown_sync()
because the callback can rearm itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wcn36xx: Fix potential use-after-free in TX ack timer teardown
wcn36xx_dxe_deinit() tears down the TX ack timer with timer_delete(),
which only dequeues the timer and does not wait for a callback that is
already executing; the preceding free_irq() calls synchronize the
interrupt handlers only. The callback, wcn36xx_dxe_tx_timer(), can
therefore be running past the teardown and use the wcn freed along
with the ieee80211_hw in wcn36xx_remove(): it takes wcn->dxe_lock,
reads wcn->tx_ack_skb and passes wcn->hw to
ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe().
Fix this by using timer_shutdown_sync(), which waits for a running
callback and also prevents the timer from being rearmed again. The
timer is set up again by wcn36xx_dxe_init() on the next start, so the
start/stop cycle is unaffected.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free of iface in cifs_try_adding_channels()
cifs_try_adding_channels() iterates ses->iface_list with
list_for_each_entry_safe_from(), which captures the next entry
(niface) under iface_lock. The loop body then drops iface_lock for
the whole duration of cifs_ses_add_channel().
A concurrent interface refresh (SMB3_request_interfaces() ->
parse_server_interfaces()) marks all ifaces inactive and removes and
frees any that are not re-advertised via list_del() + kref_put(),
where release_iface() is a bare kfree(). Since niface typically has
no channel holding a reference, the list reference is its last and it
can be freed inside the unlocked window. On continue, the iterator
advance step then dereferences niface->iface_head.next, and the loop
body reads iface->rdma_capable/is_active, both on freed memory.
Fix this by never keeping an unreferenced list pointer across the
unlocked window. Each channel attempt now re-scans the list from the
head under iface_lock, takes a kref on the selected candidate, and
passes only that referenced candidate to cifs_ses_add_channel().
weight_fulfilled still tracks selection progress, so restarting the
scan preserves the original weighted distribution and the
weight_fulfilled-before-kref_put ordering on the failure path.
Add a per-pass attempts cap so a flapping interface refresh cannot
keep the inner loop spinning within a single tries increment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
hist_register_trigger() puts the trigger on the global named_triggers
list in cmd_ops->init(), and only then sets the trace clock:
if (data->cmd_ops->init) {
ret = data->cmd_ops->init(data);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (hist_data->enable_timestamps) {
ret = tracing_set_clock(file->tr, hist_data->attrs->clock);
if (ret) {
hist_err(tr, HIST_ERR_SET_CLOCK_FAIL, errpos(clock));
goto out;
}
The clock string is not checked anywhere before that call, so a named
trigger using common_timestamp with an unknown clock fails after it has
already become findable. event_hist_trigger_parse() then frees it
without taking it off the list, and the next lookup by name reads the
freed object:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid:ts=common_timestamp:clock=bogus' > trigger
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid' > trigger
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800915d760 by task init/1
find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
hist_register_trigger+0xc1/0x900
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x3146/0x6af0
event_trigger_write+0xce/0x160
Freed by task 63:
kfree+0x154/0x420
trigger_kthread_fn+0xfd/0x160
Set the clock before the trigger is registered, so that nothing which
can fail runs after it is published, the way commit 6f86bdeab633
("tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers list") moved the
registration below the rest of the setup.
tracing_set_filter_buffering() is reference counted, so the init failure
path has to drop the reference that the clock block now takes first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/user_events: Don't destroy fields when event removal fails
destroy_user_event() destroys the event's fields before attempting to
remove the trace event call. If user_event_set_call_visible() fails,
e.g. because the event is still enabled and trace_remove_event_call()
returns -EBUSY, the event is left registered with an irreversibly
destroyed field list. Any subsequent interaction with the event then
operates on an empty field list while it is still fully visible in
tracefs.
Move the field destruction after the call removal, and splice the
field list back onto the event when the removal fails so the event
remains in a consistent state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btqcomsmd: destroy RPMsg endpoints before freeing hci_dev
The command and ACL RPMsg endpoints store struct btqcomsmd as their
callback private data. The receive callbacks dereference btq->hdev
without taking an hci_dev reference.
The current teardown order frees the hci_dev before destroying the RPMsg
endpoints in both the hci_register_dev() error path and the driver remove
path. If WCNSS delivers data in that window, the endpoint callback can
run with an already freed hci_dev and pass it to the Bluetooth core.
For qcom_smd endpoints, rpmsg_destroy_ept() closes the channel and clears
the callback under the channel recv_lock. The receive path holds the same
lock while invoking the callback, so destroying the endpoints first both
prevents new callbacks and serializes with any callback already running.
Destroy the command and ACL endpoints before hci_free_dev(). Keep
hci_unregister_dev() first during remove so the HCI core stops issuing
operations before the transport endpoints are shut down. In the full
registration-error cleanup path, return directly after freeing the hci_dev
to avoid falling through to the partial-construction labels and destroying
the endpoints twice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
genetlink: pin family module during policy dump
The generic netlink controller's policy dump keeps pointers to the target
family's operation and policy tables in its callback state. A dump may be
split across multiple skbs and remain pending after the initial request.
Netlink pins the module which owns the dump callback, but in this case
that is the controller's owner rather than the target family's owner. The
target family can consequently be unregistered and its module unloaded
while a policy dump is pending. Advancing the dump then dereferences
policy memory from the unloaded module.
Take a reference to the target family's module when the dump starts.
Drop it from the error and done paths. This matches the lifetime for which
the dump context retains the family and policy pointers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: cttimeout: prevent UAF during module unload
nf_ct_set_timeout() protects the timeout hook dereference and policy lookup
with rcu_read_lock(). cttimeout_exit(), however, unregisters the per-net
operations before it clears the hook.
This allows the following interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
cttimeout_exit() nf_ct_set_timeout()
unregister_pernet_subsys() rcu_read_lock()
kfree(pernet) h = nf_ct_timeout_hook
h->timeout_find_get()
nfct_timeout_pernet()
The hook still points to ctnl_timeout_find_get() when CPU 1 looks up the
already freed per-net timeout list. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnl_timeout_find_get
Read of size 8 by task poc/90
Call Trace:
ctnl_timeout_find_get+0x271/0x2a0 [nfnetlink_cttimeout]
nf_ct_set_timeout+0x7b/0x3c0
xt_ct_tg_check+0x724/0xb20
xt_check_target+0x234/0xa90
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x570/0x1270
Allocated by task 89:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x16e/0x460
ops_init+0x6d/0x420
register_pernet_operations+0x2f6/0x670
Freed by task 91:
kfree+0x131/0x390
ops_undo_list+0x3d4/0x730
unregister_pernet_operations+0x232/0x490
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
cttimeout_exit+0x52/0x970 [nfnetlink_cttimeout]
Clear the hook and wait for existing readers before unregistering the
per-net operations. This blocks new policy lookups and ensures readers that
observed the hook finish before the per-net storage is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
landlock: Fix use-after-free of the source's parent directory
current_check_refer_path() reads old_dentry->d_parent without holding a
reference nor a lock on it, and then dereferences it in
collect_domain_accesses() and in the audit record.
A reference on a child does not pin its parent: __d_move() reassigns
dentry->d_parent and drops the reference the child held on its former
parent. hook_path_rename() is not affected because the rename path
calls lock_rename() before the hook, so the source cannot be reparented
under it. hook_path_link() has no such protection: filename_linkat()
holds a reference on the source dentry but neither locks nor references
its parent, so a concurrent rename(2) can reparent the source while
security_path_link() runs, and the former parent can then be removed and
freed while the hook walks it.
A process can trigger this after entering a Landlock domain that handles
at least one filesystem access right. The process can then race a
linkat(2) loop against rename(2) and rmdir(2):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888160bd53f4 by task llrepro2/549
collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
current_check_refer_path+0x952/0x1120
security_path_link+0x1be/0x320
filename_linkat+0x342/0x6d0
__x64_sys_linkat+0xfa/0x150
Freed by task 562:
kmem_cache_free+0x139/0x4c0
i_callback+0x4b/0x80
rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0
Take a reference on the dentry selected as the source parent, using
dget() for the common-mount-root case and dget_parent() otherwise.
Release it after the hierarchy walk and synchronous audit logging.
[mic: Clarify the caller, reachability, and reference handling] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (gpio-fan) Fix use-after-free in alarm work
fan_alarm_irq_handler() queues fan_data->alarm_work, but nothing
cancels it. fan_alarm_notify() dereferences fan_data and its hwmon
device. On unbind, devres frees the interrupt, which only waits for
the handler itself, and then releases the hwmon device and fan_data,
so a pending fan_alarm_notify() can run after those frees.
Replace INIT_WORK() with devm_work_autocancel(), registered before
devm_request_irq(). The devres cleanup then frees the interrupt
first, so no new work can be queued, and cancels the work while
fan_data and the hwmon device are still alive.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix use-after-free of qpair work on queue teardown
The response queue MSI-X handler qla2xxx_msix_rsp_q() schedules
qla_do_work() via queue_work(ha->wq, &qpair->q_work). qla_do_work()
dereferences the qpair (vha, rsp) and takes qpair->qp_lock.
During teardown, qla2xxx_delete_qpair() deletes the response queue, which
calls free_irq() in qla25xx_free_rsp_que(), and then frees the queue and
the qpair. free_irq() waits for running hardirq handlers but does not
cancel work already placed on ha->wq. A still-pending q_work then runs
qla_do_work() against the freed qpair and response queue, causing a
use-after-free. This is especially likely during full adapter teardown,
where destroy_workqueue(ha->wq) forces pending work to run after the queue
pairs have been freed.
Flush the work item with cancel_work_sync() in qla25xx_free_rsp_que()
after free_irq() has released the interrupt (so no new work can be
queued) and before the response queue and qpair memory are freed (so the
flushed handler still sees valid memory). Guard on rsp->qpair and ha->wq
to match the INIT_WORK() condition and avoid operating on an
uninitialized work_struct. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Skip vport under deletion in report ID acquisition
qla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling walks ha->vp_list under
vport_slock, takes a vref_count on the matching vport and calls
qla_update_host_map() to register its port id.
A vport teardown via qla24xx_vport_delete() sets VPORT_DELETE, then
qla24xx_disable_vp() removes the vport from the host_map btree and zeroes
vha->d_id (RESET_AL_PA). The vport is only unlinked from vp_list later,
in qla24xx_deallocate_vp_id(), which clears vp_map[idx] (RESET_VP_IDX)
but does not touch host_map. In the window in between, report ID
acquisition can still find the vport on vp_list and call
qla_update_host_map(); with d_id already zeroed it takes the
btree_insert32() path and re-inserts the dying vport into host_map.
Nothing cleans that entry afterwards, so once scsi_host_put() frees the
vha a later host_map lookup dereferences freed memory.
Skip a vport that has VPORT_DELETE set before taking the reference, so it
is neither re-registered nor scheduled for DPC re-registration. This
mirrors the existing guard in qla2x00_alert_all_vps(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virt: acrn: Fix irqfd use-after-free during eventfd shutdown
acrn_irqfd_deassign() and the eventfd EPOLLHUP wakeup can race and free
the same struct hsm_irqfd:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
eventfd_release()
wake_up_poll(EPOLLHUP)
hsm_irqfd_wakeup()
queue_work(&irqfd->shutdown)
acrn_irqfd_deassign()
hsm_irqfd_shutdown()
list_del_init()
eventfd_ctx_remove_wait_queue()
eventfd_ctx_put()
kfree(irqfd)
hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work()
container_of(work, ..., shutdown)
irqfd->vm <-- use-after-free
The deassign path freed the irqfd while a shutdown work item was
already queued by EPOLLHUP (or vice versa), so the work item could
resurrect a dangling pointer through container_of().
Switch to the lifetime model used by KVM irqfds:
- Deassign/deinit only deactivate the irqfd: remove it from vm->irqfds
under irqfds_lock and queue the cleanup work.
- hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work() becomes the sole owner that unhooks the
eventfd waitqueue entry, drops the eventfd reference and frees the
irqfd.
- A new HSM_IRQFD_FLAG_SHUTDOWN bit guarded by test_and_set_bit()
ensures the cleanup work is queued at most once, no matter how many
of {EPOLLHUP, deassign, deinit} fire concurrently. This is safe to
call from the waitqueue callback, which runs with wqh->lock held and
IRQs disabled and therefore cannot take irqfds_lock.
- acrn_irqfd_deassign() flushes vm->irqfd_wq before returning so the
eventfd is fully detached on return. acrn_irqfd_deinit() deactivates
every irqfd, flushes the workqueue and only then destroys it, so no
path can queue_work() onto a torn-down workqueue.
- acrn_irqfd_assign() now installs the eventfd waitqueue entry and
publishes the irqfd to vm->irqfds under irqfds_lock, so the irqfd is
never visible to deassign/deinit before its waitqueue entry is in
place, and any EPOLLHUP that fires in the assign window queues
cleanup work that blocks on irqfds_lock until publication is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix addr_filter_ranges lifetime
Lee Jia Jie reported that since event::addr_filter_ranges is used
under RCU, it should be RCU freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: null RX pointers after free
When iwl_pcie_tx_init() fails after RX init, nic init unwinds via
iwl_pcie_rx_free().
The freed RX members stayed non-NULL on the live transport object,
so later teardown or retry could touch stale RX state.
Set rx_pool, global_table, rxq, and alloc_page to NULL after free
to make repeated cleanup and retry paths safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole
Punching a hole after a large buffered write may leave the range
reported as data. Reproduce it with:
xfs_io -f \
-c "pwrite -b 3m -S 0x61 0 3m" \
-c "fpunch 1m 1m" \
-c "seek -h 0" \
-c "seek -d 1m" \
/mnt/test/repro
Punching 1 MiB at offset 1 MiB should produce:
0 1 MiB 2 MiB 3 MiB
| DATA | HOLE | DATA | EOF
Instead, the entire file is reported as data. SEEK_HOLE(0) returns EOF,
and SEEK_DATA(1M) returns 1M.
This happens because a dirty folio spanning the punched range can be
written back after the punch and refill the hole.
Fix this by flushing and waiting for dirty data in the punched range
before invalidating the page cache and issuing FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA.
The xfstests generic/539 pass against Samba/ksmbd with this change. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kasan: fix cache shrink race with CPU hotplug
kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() first invokes per_cpu_remove_cache() on
all online CPUs. Each callback moves objects belonging to the cache from
cpu_quarantine to the CPU's shrink_qlist, where they can later be freed
from task context.
kmem_cache_destroy() invokes the quarantine removal path while holding
cpus_read_lock(), but kmem_cache_shrink() does not. The latter can
therefore race with CPU offlining as follows:
kmem_cache_shrink() CPU hotplug
------------------- -----------
on_each_cpu()
CPU1 moves objects to
CPU1's shrink_qlist
on_each_cpu() returns
CPU1 goes offline
kasan_cpu_offline()
drains cpu_quarantine
leaves shrink_qlist untouched
for_each_online_cpu()
skips CPU1
The objects left on CPU1's shrink_qlist are not returned to the slab
allocator. This may prevent kmem_cache_shrink() from releasing slabs that
would otherwise become empty. If CPU1 remains offline, a later
kmem_cache_destroy() also skips the list and can report that the cache
still contains objects.
An intermittent occurrence was observed with a virtio-9p filesystem. The
mount and umount commands both returned 0, but the kernel logged the
following during the userspace-triggered teardown:
[ 2994.380134][ T111] BUG 9p-fcall-cache-1 (Tainted: G B ): Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
[ 2994.381140][ T111] Object 0xff11000004361118 @offset=4376
[ 2994.381607][ T111] Allocated in p9_fcall_init+0x201/0x400 age=19564 cpu=1 pid=104
[ 2994.382591][ T111] p9_fcall_init+0x201/0x400
[ 2994.382810][ T111] p9_tag_alloc+0x12f/0x700
[ 2994.382982][ T111] p9_client_prepare_req+0x102/0x3e0
[ 2994.383165][ T111] p9_client_rpc+0x1ab/0xa50
[ 2994.383334][ T111] p9_client_getattr_dotl+0xb0/0x1a0
[ 2994.383515][ T111] v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x115/0x360
[ 2994.383719][ T111] vfs_getattr_nosec+0x22c/0x3a0
[ 2994.383910][ T111] vfs_statx+0xd7/0x170
[ 2994.384062][ T111] vfs_fstatat+0x45/0x80
[ 2994.384215][ T111] __do_sys_newfstatat+0x84/0xe0
[ 2994.384386][ T111] do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
[ 2994.384566][ T111] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2994.399720][ T111] WARNING: mm/slub.c:1244 at __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x363/0x500, CPU#0: busybox/111
[ 2994.405655][ T111] Call Trace:
[ 2994.406325][ T111] kmem_cache_destroy+0x73/0x1b0
[ 2994.406630][ T111] p9_client_destroy+0x271/0x3c0
[ 2994.407210][ T111] v9fs_session_close+0x3c/0x260
[ 2994.407409][ T111] v9fs_kill_super+0x48/0x90
[ 2994.407584][ T111] deactivate_locked_super+0xa3/0x160
[ 2994.407778][ T111] cleanup_mnt+0x1dd/0x3e0
Thus, a successful umount left objects in the 9p fcall cache and prevented
the cache from being destroyed cleanly.
Per-CPU shrink_qlist storage exists for every possible CPU, and each list
is protected by its own raw spinlock. Iterate over possible CPUs so that
a list populated before its CPU went offline is drained as well.
for_each_possible_cpu() can do more work than for_each_online_cpu(), but
this change only affects CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC kernels. The extra work is
limited to cache shrink and cache destruction paths and does not affect
the normal allocation/free fast path. It adds one raw-spinlock-protected
scan of each possible CPU's shrink list. These lists are normally empty;
a non-empty list is traversed to remove objects belonging to the cache
being shrunk or destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: fix reading neigh ha
Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to
partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to
take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which
already does the right thing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_midi: initialize work in f_midi_alloc()
f_midi_alloc initializes free_ref to 1 and it can only be incremented
when a sound card is registered via f_midi_register_card().
f_midi_register_card() is only called in f_midi_bind() which actually
performs INIT_WORK. If f_midi_bind() is never run, work is not
initialized and the if condition in f_midi_free becomes true,
this results in a warning later in __flush_work as work->func = 0.
Fix this by moving INIT_WORK from f_midi_bind() to f_midi_alloc(). |
