| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in popt, a command-line option parsing library. An off-by-one error in the poptStuffArgs function, when repeatedly called by a host application or through deep alias nesting, can lead to corruption of internal program data. This corruption could potentially enable a local attacker to execute arbitrary code if the host application then unsafely processes the altered data. |
| A flaw was found in 389 Directory Server in the __aclp__normalize_acltxt() function of aclparse.c. A malformed ACI (Access Control Instruction) string can trigger heap-buffer-overflow writes and reads during ACI parsing. The function fails to validate that the ACI keyword has sufficient length after whitespace stripping, leading to a 1-byte out-of-bounds write and subsequent out-of-bounds reads. An authenticated user with write access to the aci attribute could send a crafted ACI value to silently corrupt heap memory in the directory server process. |
| Two off-by-one errors in the FreeIPA ipa-otpd daemon's OAuth2 device authorization handler can cause out-of-bounds memory access when processing an oversized response from a configured external OAuth2/OIDC Identity Provider. An attacker who controls or can man-in-the-middle the IdP endpoint may be able to trigger ipa-otpd to write or read one byte past the end of a fixed-size buffer. Exploitation requires FreeIPA to be configured with an external IdP, attacker control or MITM of that IdP, and a user to initiate the OAuth2 device authorization flow. The most likely impact is limited denial of service affecting the ipa-otpd daemon. |
| A flaw was found in Glib's content type parsing logic. This buffer underflow vulnerability occurs because the length of a header line is stored in a signed integer, which can lead to integer wraparound for very large inputs. This results in pointer underflow and out-of-bounds memory access. Exploitation requires a local user to install or process a specially crafted treemagic file, which can lead to local denial of service or application instability. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an 'off-by-one' miscalculation when handling prefixes and suffixes for file names. This can lead to a 1-byte write overflow. While seemingly small, such an overflow can corrupt adjacent memory, leading to unpredictable program behavior, crashes, or in specific circumstances, could be leveraged as a building block for more sophisticated exploitation. This bug affects libarchive versions prior to 3.8.0. |
| A flaw was found in the clevis PKCS#11 pin. The clevis-pkcs11-afunix-socket-unlock daemon crashes when an AF_UNIX client connects to the data socket without a bound address, due to an integer underflow in the getpeername result handling. This causes a denial of service, preventing LUKS disk decryption from completing during boot. |
| A flaw was found in GStreamer's H.266 codec parser library (libgstcodecparsers). An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the DCI parsing function, where a reserved field value is incorrectly accepted, causing the parser to write beyond the bounds of an internal structure. An attacker could exploit this by providing a specially crafted H.266 bitstream to a third-party application that uses this library API, potentially causing a crash or memory corruption. No standard GStreamer pipeline element currently invokes the affected code path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: use check_add_overflow for shader size+offset bound
vmw_shader_define() validates the user-supplied shader window against
its backing buffer with
(u64)buffer->tbo.base.size < (u64)size + (u64)offset
drm_vmw_shader_create_arg::offset is __u64 in the uapi; when it is
near U64_MAX the unsigned addition wraps and the resulting tiny value
passes the check. The unbounded offset is then stored in
res->guest_memory_offset and forwarded to host SVGA shader-create
commands.
Use check_add_overflow() to detect the wrap and compare the resulting
endpoint against the buffer size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs
data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the
Format Type II transfer delimiter:
u->packets = urb_packs;
u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets;
if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II)
u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */
u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL);
buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never
recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of
the packet count the URB is built with.
prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never
consults buffer_size:
offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) {
urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs;
urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize;
offs += ep->curpacksize;
}
urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs;
urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets;
The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the
transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every
inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound
their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected.
fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any
device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets
hw_params on the stream.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report
per inbound transfer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer
Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166
__asan_memcpy
dummy_timer
hrtimer_run_softirq
Allocated by task 166:
usb_alloc_coherent
snd_usb_endpoint_set_params
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0)
Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for,
and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already
does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by
one maxsize packet.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: Fix fib_nlmsg_size() for RTA_VIA nexthops
fib_nlmsg_size() still estimates nexthop space as if every gateway is
encoded as an IPv4 RTA_GATEWAY attribute. IPv4 routes can also carry an
IPv6 gateway, which fib_nexthop_info() dumps as RTA_VIA.
As a result, route notifications can allocate an skb that is too small.
fib_dump_info() then fails with -EMSGSIZE and rtmsg_fib() hits the
WARN_ON() that marks such failures as a fib_nlmsg_size() bug. With
panic_on_warn set, this becomes a kernel panic.
Mirror the actual nexthop dump layout in fib_nlmsg_size(): account for
IPv6 nexthop gateways dumped as RTA_VIA, for the no-header rtnexthop
layout used inside RTA_MULTIPATH, and for RTA_FLOW only when it is
actually present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
snd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound
buf_end = ep->max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;
as a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer
makes buf_end negative. The loop guard then compares the u32
urb->transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual
arithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the
guard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and
payload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only
max_transfer bytes long.
A USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore
trigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds
write when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node.
Return early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is
never entered with a bound that would wrap. The loop is the last
statement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not
running.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix DMA buffer out-of-bounds write when fill_max is set
When a USB audio endpoint requests full packet transfers via the fill_max
descriptor flag, data_ep_set_params() promotes ep->curpacksize to
ep->maxpacksize. However, maxsize is left at the original sample-rate
derived value.
Since u->buffer_size is allocated as maxsize * packets, the resulting
DMA buffer is far too small for the requested transfer length. When the
USB host controller streams up to curpacksize bytes per packet, it writes
past the end of the buffer via DMA, corrupting kernel heap memory.
Update maxsize to curpacksize when fill_max is set so that the allocated
DMA buffer size matches the actual transfer request size.
[ changed to reassign maxsize only when ep->fill_max is set -- tiwai ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: core: fix supplied_from allocations
If dts property power-supplies has multiple values, then accessing to
psy->supplied_from[i-1] in __power_supply_populate_supplied_from will
overrun supplied_from array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libata-core: Reject an invalid concurrent positioning ranges count
ata_dev_config_cpr() takes the number of range descriptors from buf[0]
of the concurrent positioning ranges log (up to 255), which the device
reports independently of the log size in the GPL directory. The count is
then walked at a fixed 32-byte stride in two places with no bound: the
log read here, and the INQUIRY VPD page B9h emitter, which writes one
descriptor per range into the fixed 2048-byte ata_scsi_rbuf. A device
reporting a count larger than its own log overflows the read buffer (up
to 7704 bytes past a 512-byte slab), and a count above 62 overflows the
response buffer on the emit side.
Bound the count once, on probe, against both the log the device returned
and the number of descriptors the VPD B9h response buffer can hold
(ATA_DEV_MAX_CPR, derived from the rbuf size). Reject an out-of-range
count with a warning; this keeps the emitter in bounds with no separate
change there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_edgeport: cap received transmit credits
The interrupt-status packet reports transmit credits returned by the
device. edge_interrupt_callback() adds the 16-bit value to txCredits
without checking maxTxCredits.
edge_write() uses txCredits minus the software FIFO count as the amount
of data that fits. Since the FIFO is allocated with maxTxCredits bytes,
txCredits exceeding maxTxCredits can cause OOB write in ring buffer.
Cap accumulated credits at maxTxCredits. Conforming devices should never
hit the cap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Bound the early ACPI HID map
The ivrs_acpihid command-line parser appends entries to a fixed
four-element early_acpihid_map array. Unlike the sibling IOAPIC and HPET
parsers, it does not reject a fifth entry before incrementing the map size.
Check the capacity at the common found label before parsing the HID and
UID or writing the entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count
__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer
u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];
which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:
count = val & 0x7F;
so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:
if (samples && count > samples)
count = samples;
which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:
bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);
bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.
Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate devices are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie()
supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and
WPA2 IE copy paths use:
memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2);
where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user
supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255,
wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into
the adjacent last_mic_err_time field.
rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check
compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255
when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently.
Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the
memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the
supplicant_ie buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix next buffer leak in receive_encrypted_standard()
receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking
whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If
the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly
allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf,
making it leaked.
Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix information leak
The write() callback is supposed to return the number of characters
accepted or a negative errno. Since the addition of write fifo support
the keyspan_pda implementation will however return the number characters
submitted to the device if the write urb is not already in use. If this
number is larger than the number of characters passed to write(), the
line discipline continues writing data from beyond the tty write buffer.
Fix the information leak by making sure that keyspan_pda_write_start()
returns zero on success as intended. |
