| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was identified in the Account REST API of Keycloak that allows a user authenticated at a lower security level to perform sensitive actions intended only for higher-assurance sessions. Specifically, an attacker who has already obtained a victim’s password can delete the victim’s registered MFA/OTP credential without first proving possession of that factor. The attacker can then register their own MFA device, effectively taking full control of the account. This weakness undermines the intended protection provided by multi-factor authentication. |
| A flaw was found in the ClientResource component of Keycloak's admin services when Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) v2 is enabled. This issue allows a delegated administrator, who should only have limited control over specific clients, to attach or remove hidden client scopes that they are not authorized to see or manage. As a result, an attacker could inject unauthorized data or permissions into the security tokens issued to end-users, potentially tricking other applications into granting higher levels of access than intended. |
| A flaw was found in the Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) v2 implementation within Keycloak's administrative services. When FGAP v2 is enabled, the system fails to properly filter child groups based on the caller's specific permissions when requested through a parent group. This allows a delegated administrator to view details of child groups they are not authorized to access directly, including group names, paths, and custom attributes. |
| A flaw was found in the admin-ui-ext component of Keycloak, which provides extended administrative user interface capabilities. The issue occurs because certain bulk role-removal endpoints fail to perform granular permission checks when deleting role mappings. This allows a delegated administrator with limited permissions to remove highly privileged roles from other users or groups, potentially disrupting administrative access control. |
| A flaw was found in the user-event metrics recording of Keycloak. When metrics are enabled, the system records raw error messages from failed account operations as Prometheus metric labels. Because these error messages can include user-supplied input like nonexistent client IDs, an authenticated user can create a massive number of unique metric entries, eventually exhausting system memory and causing the service to crash or become unavailable. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML broker component of Keycloak, which is used to manage identity federation and user authentication. The issue occurs because the IdP-initiated Single Sign-On endpoint fails to check if a provider is restricted to account linking only. This allows an attacker with control over a linked upstream identity to bypass login restrictions and gain full access to a local user account. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak's Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) security policy management. The "Allowed Protocol Mapper Types" policy, which restricts which types of data mappers a client can use, fails to re-validate the mapper type during a client update if the mapper's configuration remains unchanged. An attacker with client registration privileges can exploit this by first registering an allowed mapper type with a malicious configuration and then swapping it for a restricted, high-privilege mapper type (such as one that hardcodes administrative roles). This allows the attacker to gain full administrative access to the Keycloak realm. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML metadata import functionality of the keycloak-services component, which is the core engine for identity brokering in Red Hat Build of Keycloak. When importing identity provider metadata that lacks specific usage attributes for keys, the system incorrectly disables signature validation for SAML responses even if a signing certificate is provided. This issue allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge a SAML response and gain unauthorized access to a user account by knowing their external identifier. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML broker component of Keycloak, an identity and access management solution. When configured as a SAML broker using the IdP-Initiated flow, Keycloak fails to enforce the OneTimeUse condition in SAML assertions. This allows an attacker who captures a valid, unused assertion to replay it multiple times. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to hijack a user's session and gain unauthorized access to the system as that user. |
| A vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak's Admin UI extension that allows certain administrative users to bypass security restrictions. When Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAPv2) are enabled, an administrator who should only be able to search for users (but not view their full details) can use a specific "brute-force-user" endpoint to access a user's full profile. This includes sensitive information and security metadata. The issue occurs because the system fails to check if the administrator has the required "view" permission for that specific user when using this particular search path. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. When a user account is temporarily locked due to repeated failed login attempts, an attacker with valid client credentials can exploit the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) flow to bypass this brute-force protection. This allows continued authentication attempts and token issuance even when the account should be locked, potentially enabling further unauthorized access attempts. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted request object is submitted, Keycloak may incorrectly process unsigned claims if the decrypted content is raw JSON, bypassing the configured signature policy. This allows a remote attacker to submit unauthorized claims, leading to a compromise of data integrity within the OpenID Connect (OIDC) authorization flow. While a redirect URI allowlist acts as a compensating control, this vulnerability violates OIDC Core and Financial-grade API (FAPI) signing requirements. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. When a client application is configured to accept broad redirect Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), a remote attacker can manipulate the authentication process by crafting a special web address. If a user clicks this link, the client application might incorrectly prioritize attacker-controlled information over legitimate data. This vulnerability, known as HTTP parameter pollution, could allow an attacker to bypass security measures or gain unauthorized access to resources. |
| A flaw was found in the secure-client-uris client policy executor within Keycloak core services. This component is responsible for enforcing security requirements on client configurations, such as requiring encrypted connections for redirect URIs. Due to an improper check that only looks at the start of a web address rather than properly verifying the host, an attacker can bypass these security restrictions by using a specially crafted domain name. This could allow an attacker to intercept sensitive authentication codes over unencrypted connections. |
| A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token.
The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email.
Exploitation Conditions:
The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default).
The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default).
The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider.
Concrete Impact:
Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database.
Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows.
Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak. When the JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant preview feature is enabled and a user account is disabled, Keycloak fails to validate the user’s disabled status during JWT authorization grant processing. A remote attacker with low privileges can exploit this improper access control vulnerability by presenting a valid assertion token from an external identity provider to obtain a JWT for a disabled user. This allows unauthorized access to sensitive resources. |
| A flaw was found in org.keycloak.broker.saml. When a disabled Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) client is configured as an Identity Provider (IdP)-initiated broker landing target, it can still complete the login process and establish a Single Sign-On (SSO) session. This allows a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to other enabled clients without re-authentication, effectively bypassing security restrictions. |
| The reported behavior does not constitute a privilege escalation. Exploitation requires the attacker to already possess the manage-realm administrative role within the realm-management client. By design, the manage-realm role is intended to be equivalent in administrative authority to realm-admin. A user with manage-realm already has full administrative control over the realm. Therefore, importing users with realm-admin role mappings through POST /admin/realms/{realm}/partialImport does not grant any additional privileges beyond those already held by the administrator and does not represent a security vulnerability. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak's client registration service. A remote attacker, possessing a previously issued Registration Access Token (RAT), could exploit this vulnerability to re-enable a client that an administrator had explicitly disabled. This bypasses security controls, allowing the attacker to reset the client's secret and potentially regain privileged API access. The primary impact includes unauthorized information disclosure and potential integrity compromise. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak. This JWT algorithm confusion vulnerability in the JWT Authorization Grant flow allows an attacker with valid client credentials to bypass signature verification. By forging an assertion, the attacker can create unauthorized access tokens. This enables the attacker to impersonate any federated user linked to the affected Identity Provider, leading to unauthorized access and potential privilege escalation. |
