| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: use the backlog for mirred ingress
The test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 ("act_mirred: use the backlog
for nested calls to mirred ingress") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so
runs, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by
lockdep.
The problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that
if we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)
we may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may
still be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks
is to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path
inline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once
we started to nest mirred calls.
In the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will
lead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current
workaround does not seem to address the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: Avoid touching renamed directory if parent does not change
The VFS will not be locking moved directory if its parent does not
change. Change ocfs2 rename code to avoid touching renamed directory if
its parent does not change as without locking that can corrupt the
filesystem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack
memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses
were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted
above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the
stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but
otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the
stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places:
- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
- in check_stack_range_initialized()
This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests
that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were
changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior
persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it
can't run unprivileged for other reasons.
This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset
reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one
because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack
using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers
with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the
function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program
to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime
because a too small stack had been allocated for it.
Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in
bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by
update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()
was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed
part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was
incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used
instead.
This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in
grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to
check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is
now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.
check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been
allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.
A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The
one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Yoosee GM8135S Camera 21.00.01.36. This impacts an unknown function of the file wpa_supplicantX.conf of the component WiFi Configuration. Such manipulation leads to improper initialization. The attack can only be initiated within the local network. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| When implementing the JavaScript interface, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader did not perform the attribute authorization checks required by the specification. As a result, a trusted malicious PDF could potentially access sensitive content from other documents within the same process and transmit it externally. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61. |
| An Improper Initialization vulnerability in the SSR software in Juniper Networks Session Smart Router allows an attacker to decrypt traffic or cause a denial of service via security policy assignment. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. From 1.6.1 until 1.6.2, a successful MMS ObtainFile operation closes MmsObtainFileTask::fileHandle but leaves the stale non-NULL value in a task marked MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_NOT_USED. If a later ObtainFile request reuses that task and destination creation fails, MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_SEND_OBTAIN_FILE_ERROR_DESTINATION cleanup closes the stale FILE object again. Servers with the MMS file service and ObtainFile enabled can therefore be crashed remotely by the success-then-failure request sequence. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/insn-eval: Fix shadowed segment index in get_seg_reg_override_idx()
Commit 45e1dccc0653 ("x86/insn: Simplify for_each_insn_prefix()") made
for_each_insn_prefix() declare its own loop counter named idx.
get_seg_reg_override_idx() keeps its result in a local of the same name,
so the assignments in the loop body now write the loop counter:
- the function always returns INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT, so FS and GS
overrides are ignored;
- a CS override sets the counter to INAT_SEG_REG_CS (2), the increment
makes it 3, and prefixes.bytes[3] holds the last prefix, 0x2e again,
so the loop never terminates.
The UMIP emulation reaches this from the #GP handler for user space: an
SGDT, SIDT or SMSW with a memory operand and a CS prefix leaves the task
spinning in the kernel, never returning to user space, with a SIGKILL
that is never delivered. Any user can thus tie up CPUs until reboot.
With an FS or GS prefix, the emulated result is written to the wrong
address.
Rename the internal macro iterator variable.
[ Lukas' original patch renamed the use site, I changed it to rename the
iterator in the macro instead, but left Lukas' commit message and
authorship - Linus ] |
| Roundcube Webmail before 1.6.20 and 1.7.x before 1.7.5 is affected by a CSS scoping bypass in HTML messages. rcube_utils::mod_css_styles() did not treat an at-rule prologue such as @layer a; as a selector boundary, and did not handle selectors beginning with ::, so selectors following an at-rule were left unscoped and applied to the whole Roundcube interface instead of being confined to the message body. This allows an HTML message to restyle application chrome for UI redressing and spoofing. Upstream fixed this in the commit “Fix CSS scoping bypass in HTML messages using at-rules”. |
| A improper locking vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 8.0.0, FortiOS 7.6.4 through 7.6.6 may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the device to cause a denial of service of the HTTPS management interface via crafted HTTP requests. |
| NetBox versions 2.9.5 before 4.7.0 contain a server-side template injection vulnerability that allows a low-privileged user with the "Can add custom links" permission to steal session cookies and API tokens of other users by exposing the raw Django HttpRequest object to the Jinja2 template context. Attackers can craft a custom link template embedding request.COOKIES['sessionid'] or a user's API token into an img src URL, which bypasses the clean_html sanitizer and auto-exfiltrates the victim's credentials to an attacker-controlled host when a privileged user views the object, enabling full account takeover. |
| Wheels 4.0.0 through 4.1.2 before 4.2.0 replaces incoming scope conditions with a primary-key condition in findByKey() and exists(key=). For exists(key=), production with error information disabled returns true for an out-of-scope key instead of throwing. Applications relying on scopes for ownership or tenant authorization can therefore load and subsequently modify or delete another user's or tenant's record when the key comes from a request. The 4.2.0 fix combines key conditions with incoming scope, query-builder or where conditions in findByKey(), exists(key=), updateByKey() and deleteByKey(). Other scope-aware finders, aggregates, updateAll() and deleteAll() are not affected. |
| Invalid pointer, undefined behavior in the DOM: Notifications component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 158 and Thunderbird 158. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Drop task_to_inode and inet_conn_established from lsm sleepable hooks
bpf_lsm_task_to_inode() is called under rcu_read_lock() and
bpf_lsm_inet_conn_established() is called from softirq context, so
neither hook can be used by sleepable LSM programs. |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, Cisco has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-76300 are related to improper control of a resource through its lifetime and are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-664. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan966x: restore RX state on reload failure
lan966x_fdma_reload() backs up rx->page_pool and rx->fdma before
reallocating the RX resources for the new MTU. If the allocation fails,
the restore path puts these fields back before restarting RX.
However, the reload path also updates rx->page_order and rx->max_mtu
before calling lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc(). These fields are not restored on
failure, so RX can be restarted with the old pages, old FDMA state and
old page pool, but with the page geometry from the failed new MTU.
This can make the XDP path advertise a frame size derived from the new
page_order while the actual RX pages still come from the old allocation.
For example, after a failed reload to a jumbo MTU, xdp_init_buff() may be
called with a frame size larger than the restored RX pages.
lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc_page_pool() also registers the newly allocated page
pool with each port's XDP RXQ before fdma_alloc_coherent() is called. If
fdma_alloc_coherent() fails, the new page pool is destroyed, but the
rollback path does not restore the per-port XDP RXQ mem model
registration either.
Save and restore rx->page_order and rx->max_mtu, and restore the old page
pool registration for each port's XDP RXQ before RX is started again.
This keeps the restored RX state consistent after a failed reload. |
| OpenClaw (aka clawdbot or Moltbot) before 2026.1.29 obtains a gatewayUrl value from a query string and automatically makes a WebSocket connection without prompting, sending a token value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: stop exchanging reflink flags when exchanging mappings
When an exchange covers both files from offset 0 to i_disk_size,
xmi_can_exchange_reflink_flags() assumes every mapping moved and hands
the reflink flag over to the other file.
That assumption is wrong. A file can still own shared blocks past
i_disk_size, e.g. after EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF sets a smaller size
without unmapping anything. The flag is cleared anyway, and the next
write to such a block happens in place instead of CoW, corrupting the
other file that shares it.
Commit a23eca88448e ("xfs: fix exchange-range reflink flag clearing
issue with INO1_WRITTEN") fixed one instance of this. Rather than add
another special case, stop moving the flags.
xfs_exchmaps_ensure_reflink() already sets the flag on both inodes
before the exchange, so both just keep it.
Nothing sets CLEAR_INO{1,2}_REFLINK anymore. Intents logged by older
kernels may still carry them; recovery already masks them off, so they
stay in the log format mask and are ignored.
XFS_IOC_SWAPEXT has the same problem: it moves the reflink flag from
one inode to the other along with the extents. Just removing that is
not enough here: the exchange path flags both inodes up front in
xfs_exchmaps_ensure_reflink(), but swapext has no such step, so the
inode receiving the shared extents would be left without the flag.
Set it on both inodes instead, and make sure both have a CoW fork,
since an inode with the reflink flag is expected to have one.
The flag now stays until FALLOC_FL_UNSHARE_RANGE, xfs_scrub, or a
truncate to zero removes it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item
If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.
This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value's data and set the value's length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name's length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.
The following script reproduces the issue:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
touch $MNT/testfile
# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
# name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
setfattr -n user.WvG1c1Td -v qwerty $MNT/testfile
# Verify the xattrs are present.
echo "xattrs before:"
getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
# Now replace the value of the foobar xattr with a significantly larger
# value.
setfattr -n user.foobar -v abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz $MNT/testfile
# Check the xattrs have the expected values.
echo "xattrs after:"
getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
umount $MNT
Running it:
$ ./test.sh
(...)
xattrs before:
# file: /mnt/sdi/testfile
user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty"
user.foobar="123"
xattrs after:
# file: /mnt/sdi/testfile
user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty"
So the "user.foobar" xattr is missing and there was a transaction abort
when unmounting the fs with the following traces in dmesg:
$ dmesg
[869800.159271] BTRFS warning (device sdi): access to eb bytenr 30474240 len 16384 out of range start 16015 len 25964
[869800.159293] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[869800.159296] WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4408 at report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs], CPU#8: getfattr/2605179
[869800.168961] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_thin_pool (...)
[869800.190527] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 2605179 Comm: getfattr Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-244+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
[869800.193726] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[869800.194502] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[869800.197576] RIP: 0010:report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs]
[869800.198985] Code: 48 8b 7b 18 (...)
[869800.203531] RSP: 0018:ffffce4541937d58 EFLAGS: 00010246
[869800.204609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8dde054b8738 RCX: 0000000000000000
[869800.206137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc04c92a0
[869800.207645] RBP: 0000000000003e8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff
[869800.226175] R10: ffffce4541937a88 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 000000000000656c
[869800.227594] R13: ffff8dde14be800f R14: 000000000000656c R15: 0000000000000069
[869800.229097] FS: 00007f59023bb780(0000) GS:ffff8de5788ed000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[869800.231137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[869800.232321] CR2: 0000558dc45e6a78 CR3: 0000000765b16004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[869800.233783] Call Trace:
[869800.234330] <TASK>
[869800.234791] read_extent_buffer+0x4d/0x100 [btrfs]
[869800.235898] btrfs_listxattr+0x199/0x240 [btrfs]
[869800.236912] vfs_listxattr+0x51/0
---truncated--- |