| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in popt. This vulnerability allows an attacker to provide specially crafted configuration content to a host, which, when loaded, can lead to a small memory corruption issue. This occurs because of an error in how the `poptConfigFileToString` function reallocates memory for buffers. Successful exploitation could result in heap metadata corruption, potentially causing the affected process to become unavailable (denial of service). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reallocate update replies for mismatched IDs
ovs_flow_cmd_new() preallocates the optional reply skb before it takes
ovs_mutex and before it knows which existing flow will be updated.
That is normally fine because the skb is sized from the request flow
identifier. That identifier also becomes the inserted flow's identifier.
For updates, however, a request with a UFID may miss the UFID lookup and
then fall back to the flow key lookup. That lookup can legitimately find
an existing key-identified flow. UFIDs are optional and the flow key is
the primary identifier.
For echoed replies, ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info() writes the matched flow's
identifier, not the request identifier used for the preallocation. A short
request UFID can therefore leave too little room for the key identifier.
The fill can then fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit the BUG_ON(error < 0) in the
update path.
Once the update target has been resolved, reallocate the reply skb if the
matched flow needs a larger reply than the request identifier allowed. Do
this before replacing the actions so the request can still fail cleanly if
the rare extra allocation fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix buffer overflow in SDMA queue checkpoint/restore on GFX11
The v11 MQD manager incorrectly assigned the CP-compute variants of
checkpoint_mqd/restore_mqd for KFD_MQD_TYPE_SDMA queues. These functions
use sizeof(struct v11_compute_mqd) (2048 bytes) instead of sizeof(struct
v11_sdma_mqd) (512 bytes), causing a 1536-byte overflow.
During CRIU checkpoint of an SDMA queue on Navi3x:
- checkpoint_mqd() reads 2048 bytes from a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
leaking 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory to userspace
During CRIU restore:
- restore_mqd() writes 2048 bytes into a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
corrupting 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory (often the ring buffer
or neighboring MQDs)
This is a copy-paste regression unique to v11. All other ASIC backends
(cik, vi, v9, v10, v12) correctly use the SDMA-specific variants.
Add checkpoint_mqd_sdma() and restore_mqd_sdma() functions that properly
handle the smaller v11_sdma_mqd structure, matching the pattern used in
other MQD managers.
(cherry picked from commit 6fa41db7ffdec97d62433adf03b7b9b759af8c2c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi/capsule-loader: fix incorrect sizeof in phys array reallocation
The krealloc() call for cap_info->phys in __efi_capsule_setup_info() uses
sizeof(phys_addr_t *) instead of sizeof(phys_addr_t), which might be
causing an undersized allocation.
The allocation is also inconsistent with the initial array allocation in
efi_capsule_open() that allocates one entry with sizeof(phys_addr_t),
and the efi_capsule_write() function that stores phys_addr_t values (not
pointers) via page_to_phys().
On 64-bit systems where sizeof(phys_addr_t) == sizeof(phys_addr_t *), this
goes unnoticed. On 32-bit systems with PAE where phys_addr_t is 64-bit but
pointers are 32-bit, this allocates half the required space, which might
lead to a heap buffer overflow when storing physical addresses.
This is similar to the bug fixed in commit fccfa646ef36 ("efi/capsule-loader:
fix incorrect allocation size") which fixed the same issue at the initial
allocation site. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: fix macvlan_get_size() not reserving space for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF
macvlan_get_size() does not account for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF, but
macvlan_fill_info() conditionally includes it when port->bc_cutoff != 1.
This causes nla_put_s32() to fail with -EMSGSIZE when the netlink skb
runs out of space, triggering a WARN_ON in rtnetlink and preventing the
interface from being dumped.
The bug can be reproduced with:
ip link add macvlan0 link eth0 type macvlan mode bridge
ip link set macvlan0 type macvlan bc_cutoff 0
ip -d link show macvlan0 # fails with -EMSGSIZE
The bc_cutoff feature was added in commit 954d1fa1ac93 ("macvlan: Add
netlink attribute for broadcast cutoff"), which added the nla_put_s32()
call in macvlan_fill_info() but missed adding the corresponding
nla_total_size(4) in macvlan_get_size(). A follow-up commit
55cef78c244d ("macvlan: add forgotten nla_policy for
IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF") fixed the missing nla_policy entry but still
did not fix the size calculation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix OOB write to userspace in sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks
sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks() checks that the caller's optval
buffer is large enough for the peer AUTH chunk list with
if (len < num_chunks)
return -EINVAL;
but then writes num_chunks bytes to p->gauth_chunks, which lives
at offset offsetof(struct sctp_authchunks, gauth_chunks) == 8
inside optval. The check is missing the sizeof(struct
sctp_authchunks) = 8-byte header. When the caller supplies
len == num_chunks (for any num_chunks > 0) the test passes but
copy_to_user() writes sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) = 8 bytes
past the declared buffer.
The sibling function sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks() at the
next line already has the correct check:
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks)
return -EINVAL;
Align the peer variant with its sibling.
Reproducer confirms on v7.0-13-generic: an unprivileged userspace
caller that opens a loopback SCTP association with AUTH enabled,
queries num_chunks with a short optval, then issues the real
getsockopt with len == num_chunks and sentinel bytes painted past
the buffer observes those sentinel bytes overwritten with the
peer's AUTH chunk type. The bytes written are under the peer's
control but land in the caller's own userspace; this is not a
kernel memory corruption, but it is a kernel-side contract
violation that can silently corrupt adjacent userspace data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Fix reservation of unaccepted memory table
The reserve_unaccepted() function incorrectly calculates the size of the
memblock reservation for the unaccepted memory table. It aligns the
size of the table, but fails to account for cases where the table's
starting physical address (efi.unaccepted) is not page-aligned.
If the table starts at an offset within a page and its end crosses into
a subsequent page that the aligned size does not cover, the end of the
table will not be reserved. This can lead to the table being overwritten
or inaccessible, causing a kernel panic in accept_memory().
This issue was observed when starting Intel TDX VMs with specific memory
sizes (e.g., > 64GB).
Fix this by calculating the end address first (including the unaligned
start) and then aligning it up, ensuring the entire range is covered
by the reservation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: cap upcall PID array size and pre-size vport replies
The vport netlink reply helpers allocate a fixed-size skb with
nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, ...) but serialize the full upcall PID
array via ovs_vport_get_upcall_portids(). Since
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids() accepts any non-zero multiple of
sizeof(u32) with no upper bound, a CAP_NET_ADMIN user can install a PID
array large enough to overflow the reply buffer, causing nla_put() to
fail with -EMSGSIZE and hitting BUG_ON(err < 0). On systems with
unprivileged user namespaces enabled (e.g., Ubuntu default), this is
reachable via unshare -Urn since OVS vport mutation operations use
GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM.
kernel BUG at net/openvswitch/datapath.c:2414!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00195-geb216e422044 #1
RIP: 0010:ovs_vport_cmd_set+0x34c/0x400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1116)
genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject attempts to set more PIDs than nr_cpu_ids in
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids(), and pre-compute the worst-case reply
size in ovs_vport_cmd_msg_size() based on that bound, similar to the
existing ovs_dp_cmd_msg_size(). nr_cpu_ids matches the cap already
used by the per-CPU dispatch configuration on the datapath side
(ovs_dp_cmd_fill_info() serialises at most nr_cpu_ids PIDs), so the
two sides stay consistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/buddy: Prevent BUG_ON by validating rounded allocation
When DRM_BUDDY_CONTIGUOUS_ALLOCATION is set, the requested size is
rounded up to the next power-of-two via roundup_pow_of_two().
Similarly, for non-contiguous allocations with large min_block_size,
the size is aligned up via round_up(). Both operations can produce a
rounded size that exceeds mm->size, which later triggers
BUG_ON(order > mm->max_order).
Example scenarios:
- 9G CONTIGUOUS allocation on 10G VRAM memory:
roundup_pow_of_two(9G) = 16G > 10G
- 9G allocation with 8G min_block_size on 10G VRAM memory:
round_up(9G, 8G) = 16G > 10G
Fix this by checking the rounded size against mm->size. For
non-contiguous or range allocations where size > mm->size is invalid,
return -EINVAL immediately. For contiguous allocations without range
restrictions, allow the request to fall through to the existing
__alloc_contig_try_harder() fallback.
This ensures invalid user input returns an error or uses the fallback
path instead of hitting BUG_ON.
v2: (Matt A)
- Add Fixes, Cc stable, and Closes tags for context |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: account XFRMA_IF_ID in aevent size calculation
xfrm_get_ae() allocates the reply skb with xfrm_aevent_msgsize(), then
build_aevent() appends attributes including XFRMA_IF_ID when x->if_id is
set.
xfrm_aevent_msgsize() does not include space for XFRMA_IF_ID. For states
with if_id, build_aevent() can fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit BUG_ON(err < 0)
in xfrm_get_ae(), turning a malformed netlink interaction into a kernel
panic.
Account XFRMA_IF_ID in the size calculation unconditionally and replace
the BUG_ON with normal error unwinding. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption
The check for the minimum receive buffer size did not take the
tag size into account during decryption. Fix this by adding the
required extra length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Change AMDGPU_VA_RESERVED_TRAP_SIZE to 64KB
Currently, AMDGPU_VA_RESERVED_TRAP_SIZE is hardcoded to 8KB, while
KFD_CWSR_TBA_TMA_SIZE is defined as 2 * PAGE_SIZE. On systems with
4K pages, both values match (8KB), so allocation and reserved space
are consistent.
However, on 64K page-size systems, KFD_CWSR_TBA_TMA_SIZE becomes 128KB,
while the reserved trap area remains 8KB. This mismatch causes the
kernel to crash when running rocminfo or rccl unit tests.
Kernel attempted to read user page (2) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1001)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000002
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000002c8a64
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 34 UID: 1001 PID: 9379 Comm: rocminfo Tainted: G E
6.19.0-rc4-amdgpu-00320-gf23176405700 #56 VOLUNTARY
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: IBM,9105-42A POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006
of:IBM,FW1060.30 (ML1060_896) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000002c8a64 LR: c00000000125dbc8 CTR: c00000000125e730
REGS: c0000001e0957580 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G E
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24008268
XER: 00000036
CFAR: c00000000125dbc4 DAR: 0000000000000002 DSISR: 40000000
IRQMASK: 1
GPR00: c00000000125d908 c0000001e0957820 c0000000016e8100
c00000013d814540
GPR04: 0000000000000002 c00000013d814550 0000000000000045
0000000000000000
GPR08: c00000013444d000 c00000013d814538 c00000013d814538
0000000084002268
GPR12: c00000000125e730 c000007e2ffd5f00 ffffffffffffffff
0000000000020000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 c00000015f653000
0000000000000000
GPR20: c000000138662400 c00000013d814540 0000000000000000
c00000013d814500
GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 c0000001e0957888
c0000001e0957878
GPR28: c00000013d814548 0000000000000000 c00000013d814540
c0000001e0957888
NIP [c0000000002c8a64] __mutex_add_waiter+0x24/0xc0
LR [c00000000125dbc8] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x318/0xd00
Call Trace:
0xc0000001e0957890 (unreliable)
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x58/0xd00
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x6fc/0xb60 [amdgpu]
kfd_process_alloc_gpuvm+0x54/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
kfd_process_device_init_cwsr_dgpu+0xa4/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
kfd_process_device_init_vm+0xd8/0x2e0 [amdgpu]
kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm+0xd0/0x130 [amdgpu]
kfd_ioctl+0x514/0x670 [amdgpu]
sys_ioctl+0x134/0x180
system_call_exception+0x114/0x300
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This patch changes AMDGPU_VA_RESERVED_TRAP_SIZE to 64 KB and
KFD_CWSR_TBA_TMA_SIZE to the AMD GPU page size. This means we reserve
64 KB for the trap in the address space, but only allocate 8 KB within
it. With this approach, the allocation size never exceeds the reserved
area.
(cherry picked from commit 31b8de5e55666f26ea7ece5f412b83eab3f56dbb) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: nexthop: allocate skb dynamically in rtm_get_nexthop()
When querying a nexthop object via RTM_GETNEXTHOP, the kernel currently
allocates a fixed-size skb using NLMSG_GOODSIZE. While sufficient for
single nexthops and small Equal-Cost Multi-Path groups, this fixed
allocation fails for large nexthop groups like 512 nexthops.
This results in the following warning splat:
WARNING: net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395 at rtm_get_nexthop+0x176/0x1c0, CPU#20: rep/4608
[...]
RIP: 0010:rtm_get_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395)
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6989)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:721 net/socket.c:736 net/socket.c:2585)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2641)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2671)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Fix this by allocating the size dynamically using nh_nlmsg_size() and
using nlmsg_new(), this is consistent with nexthop_notify() behavior. In
addition, adjust nh_nlmsg_size_grp() so it calculates the size needed
based on flags passed. While at it, also add the size of NHA_FDB for
nexthop group size calculation as it was missing too.
This cannot be reproduced via iproute2 as the group size is currently
limited and the command fails as follows:
addattr_l ERROR: message exceeded bound of 1048 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_key: validate families in pfkey_send_migrate()
syzbot was able to trigger a crash in skb_put() [1]
Issue is that pfkey_send_migrate() does not check old/new families,
and that set_ipsecrequest() @family argument was truncated,
thus possibly overfilling the skb.
Validate families early, do not wait set_ipsecrequest().
[1]
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8a752120 len:392 put:16 head:ffff88802a4ad040 data:ffff88802a4ad040 tail:0x188 end:0x180 dev:<NULL>
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214 !
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:219 [inline]
skb_put+0x159/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:2655
skb_put_zero include/linux/skbuff.h:2788 [inline]
set_ipsecrequest net/key/af_key.c:3532 [inline]
pfkey_send_migrate+0x1270/0x2e50 net/key/af_key.c:3636
km_migrate+0x155/0x260 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2848
xfrm_migrate+0x2140/0x2450 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:4705
xfrm_do_migrate+0x8ff/0xaa0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3150 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check
The same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also
exists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated
against the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing
out-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to
express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
Compile-tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: change XDP RxQ frag_size from DMA write length to xdp.frame_sz
The only user of frag_size field in XDP RxQ info is
bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(). It clearly expects whole buff size instead
of DMA write size. Different assumptions in ice driver configuration lead
to negative tailroom.
This allows to trigger kernel panic, when using
XDP_ADJUST_TAIL_GROW_MULTI_BUFF xskxceiver test and changing packet size to
6912 and the requested offset to a huge value, e.g.
XSK_UMEM__MAX_FRAME_SIZE * 100.
Due to other quirks of the ZC configuration in ice, panic is not observed
in ZC mode, but tailroom growing still fails when it should not.
Use fill queue buffer truesize instead of DMA write size in XDP RxQ info.
Fix ZC mode too by using the new helper. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. Processing a specially crafted PVR image file with large dimensions can lead to a denial of service (DoS). This occurs due to a stack-based buffer overflow and an out-of-bounds read in the PVR image loader, causing the application to crash. Systems that process untrusted PVR image files are affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtnetlink: Allocate vfinfo size for VF GUIDs when supported
Commit 30aad41721e0 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs")
added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo
messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the
function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following
warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node
GUIDs:
# echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs
# ip link show dev ib0
RTNETLINK answers: Message too long
Cannot send link get request: Message too long
Kernel warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8
RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00
R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS: 00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0xa5/0x230
? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
? report_bug+0x22d/0x240
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80
? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10
? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0
? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70
? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210
? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10
? lock_release+0x62/0x200
? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? lock_release+0x62/0x200
? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290
netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480
? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410
netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660
? lock_release+0x62/0x200
? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0
? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0
? lock_release+0x62/0x200
? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0
? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0
? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150
? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0
? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0
? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: set the right AMDGPU sg segment limitation
The driver needs to set the correct max_segment_size;
otherwise debug_dma_map_sg() will complain about the
over-mapping of the AMDGPU sg length as following:
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1964 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1178 debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049444] Modules linked in: veth amdgpu(OE) amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy drm_ttm_helper ttm(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace netfs xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo iptable_nat xt_addrtype iptable_filter br_netfilter nvme_fabrics overlay nfnetlink_cttimeout nfnetlink openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c bridge stp llc amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc sch_fq_codel snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_scodec_component snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg edac_mce_amd binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec snd_pci_acp6x snd_hda_core snd_acp_config snd_hwdep snd_soc_acpi kvm_amd snd_pcm kvm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_rawmidi sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel snd_seq nls_iso8859_1 crypto_simd snd_seq_device cryptd snd_timer rapl input_leds snd
[ 364.049532] ipmi_devintf wmi_bmof ccp serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco soundcore ipmi_msghandler cm32181 industrialio mac_hid msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables pci_stub crc32_pclmul nvme ahci libahci i2c_piix4 r8169 nvme_core i2c_designware_pci realtek i2c_ccgx_ucsi video wmi hid_generic cdc_ether usbnet usbhid hid r8152 mii
[ 364.049576] CPU: 6 PID: 1964 Comm: rocminfo Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-custom #492
[ 364.049579] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS RMJ1009A 06/13/2021
[ 364.049582] RIP: 0010:debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049585] Code: 89 4d b8 e8 36 b1 86 00 8b 4d b8 48 8b 55 b0 44 8b 45 a8 4c 8b 4d a0 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 00 4b 74 bc 4c 89 4d b8 e8 b4 73 f3 ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 15 c8 2c b8 01 85 d2 0f 85 ee fd ff ff 8b 05
[ 364.049588] RSP: 0018:ffff9ca600b57ac0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 364.049590] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b7c132b0c8 RCX: 0000000000000027
[ 364.049592] RDX: ffff88bb0f521688 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88bb0f521680
[ 364.049594] RBP: ffff9ca600b57b20 R08: 000000000000006f R09: ffff9ca600b57930
[ 364.049596] R10: ffff9ca600b57928 R11: ffffffffbcb46328 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 364.049597] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88b7c19c0700 R15: ffff88b7c9059800
[ 364.049599] FS: 00007fb2d3516e80(0000) GS:ffff88bb0f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 364.049601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 364.049603] CR2: 000055610bd03598 CR3: 00000001049f6000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 364.049605] Call Trace:
[ 364.049607] <TASK>
[ 364.049609] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
[ 364.049614] ? __warn+0x8c/0x140
[ 364.049618] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049621] ? report_bug+0x193/0x1a0
[ 364.049627] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
[ 364.049631] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
[ 364.049635] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[ 364.049642] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049647] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x90/0xe0
[ 364.049651] dma_map_sgtable+0x25/0x40
[ 364.049654] amdgpu_bo_move+0x59a/0x850 [amdgpu]
[ 364.049935] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 364.049939] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_populate+0x5d/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050095] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xc3/0x180 [ttm]
[ 364.050103] ttm_bo_validate+0xc1/0x160 [ttm]
[ 364.050108] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages+0xe5/0x1b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050263] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0xa12/0xc90 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050473] kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x16b/0x3b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050680] kfd_ioctl+0x3c2/0x530 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050866] ? __pfx_kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 364.05105
---truncated--- |
| A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in the APNG (Animated PNG) file loader of GIMP. This flaw occurs when the `fcTL` width exceeds the `IHDR` width, leading to pixel data being written past the end of a heap allocation. Additionally, a heap-based buffer overflow exists in the DDS plug-in due to a BPP mismatch in the `load_layer()` function. Both vulnerabilities can be triggered by opening a specially crafted image file, potentially leading to code execution. |
