Description
The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards.
The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request.
The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds.
The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well.
The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request.
The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds.
The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well.
Analysis
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Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | unaffected |
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Remediation
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References
History
Tue, 10 Nov 2026 22:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards. The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request. The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds. The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well. | |
| Title | Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr HTTP/2 server static-filesystem handler via corrupted receive-buffer length | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-10T22:07:39.047Z
Reserved: 2026-08-28T21:11:46.166Z
Link: CVE-2026-82391
Vulnrichment
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NVD
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-11-10T22:21:05.710
Modified: 2026-11-10T22:21:05.823
Link: CVE-2026-82391
Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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Weaknesses